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Part II
The Changing Court and
Court Dynamics

Justice Suzanne Côté’s Reputation as
a Dissenter on the Supreme Court of
Canada
Vanessa A. MacDonnell*

I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Suzanne Côté was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in
December 2014. In her brief tenure on the Court she has developed a
reputation as a frequent dissenter. In this short paper I examine whether the
label is justified. I examine the frequency with which Justice Côté is
dissenting, both relative to the overall rate of dissents of the current
Supreme Court and to historical standards. I also delve into the nature of
her disagreements with the majority, including her highly unconventional
practice of dissenting on leave applications. What emerges is a picture of a
justice whose willingness to speak in her own voice and to disagree is at
odds with the practices of the current Supreme Court, and in particular, with
recently retired Chief Justice McLachlin’s efforts to achieve unanimity.1
Perhaps equally revealing, however, is that the frequency with which
Justice Côté disagrees is not necessarily notable by historical standards.
In this paper I treat both concurrences and dissents as forms of
disagreement.2 As Belleau, Johnson & Vickers explain, “In English, the
*
Associate Professor, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law. I am grateful to the students in my
Supreme Court Seminar for sharpening my understanding of the significance of judges’ life stories for their
judicial approach. I am also grateful to Bruce Ryder, Constance Backhouse, Marie-Claire Belleau, Stephen
Bindman, Owen Rees, Amy Salyzyn, Michael Plaxton, Adam Dodek, Matan Goldblatt, Leo Russomanno,
Ralston MacDonnell and the peer reviewers for useful conversations and comments, and to Sonia
Lawrence and Benjamin Berger for inviting me to present on this topic at Osgoode Hall Law School’s
2018 Constitutional Cases Conference. This paper is current to March 25, 2018.
1
Emmett Macfarlane, “Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court” (2010) 52 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 379. On the significance of “authorship” and “voice”, see Marie-Claire Belleau, Rebecca Johnson &
Christina Vinters, “Voicing an Opinion: Authorship, Collaboration and the Judgments of Justice Bertha
Wilson” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 53 [hereinafter “Belleau, Johnson & Vinters”].
2
Mathen explains that “‘Dissent’ can refer, narrowly, to a departure from the majority in
both reasoning and result .... It also can be used more broadly to include a departure with respect to
the reasoning but not the result ..., or a departure with respect to the result but not the reasoning ....
Some refer to dissents in the latter category as concurrences.” See Carissima Mathen, “The Upside
of Dissent in Equality Jurisprudence” (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 111, at 112 n4 [hereinafter “Mathen”].
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word ‘concur’ means ‘to agree’, but in law, the concurrence is a form of
disagreement. This is perhaps more evident for francophone than
anglophone readers since in French, the terms dissent and concurrence
are rendered as dissidences sur les résultats [dissents on the result] and
dissidences sur les motifs [dissents on the reasons].”3 In some instances,
the fact that the concurring judge ultimately agrees with the disposition
of the majority is almost beside the point. Drawing on data compiled by
Belleau & Johnson on the concurring and dissenting practices of
Supreme Court of Canada justices between 1982 and 2007,4 I show that
Justice Côté’s combined rate of concurrences and dissents does not
approach that of the so-called “great dissenters”, including Justices
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé and Bertha Wilson.5 Her aggregate rate of
concurrences and dissents is average when compared to this earlier
period. That said, Justice Côté’s rate of dissents exceeds that of the great
dissenters. This suggests that however unusual Justice Côté’s dissenting
practices may be relative to the current Court, the numbers must be
assessed in historical context and with the necessary nuance.
I begin this paper by sketching Justice Côté’s trajectory as a legal
professional, drawing on publicly available information. Part III briefly
describes the methodology I employed in this study, while Part IV
outlines the findings. In Part V, I offer some tentative conclusions about
Justice Côté’s rate of dissents, before concluding in Part VI.

II. BACKGROUND
Justice Suzanne Côté was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada
by then Prime Minister Stephen Harper on December 1, 2014, at the age
of 56. She replaced Justice Louis LeBel, becoming one of the Supreme
Court’s three Quebec judges. Her appointment restored the Court’s
composition to four women and five men after the Court sat briefly as six

3

Belleau, Johnson & Vinters, supra, note 1, at 55.
Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “Judging Gender: Difference and Dissent at
the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 15 International Journal of the Legal Profession 57
[hereinafter “Belleau & Johnson”].
5
Belleau, Johnson & Vinters, supra, note 1, at 61; Constance Backhouse, Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé: A Life (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017), at 373-76
[hereinafter “Backhouse”]; Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2005), at 453-81 [hereinafter “Girard”].
4
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men and three women.6 She is the first woman to be elevated to the
Supreme Court directly from practice, and is bilingual.7 Justice Côté’s
appointment occurred after the Harper Government suspended the formal
judicial appointments process in the wake of the Nadon controversy.8 As
such, her appointment was made without the involvement of an advisory
committee. She did not appear before a parliamentary committee to
answer questions prior to being sworn in.9
Justice Côté attended law school at Laval and was called to the bar in
1981. Shortly thereafter, she purchased half of a law practice in Gaspé,
where she worked for several years.10 She quickly became a leader in the
community. She assumed the position of President of the Gaspé Chamber
of Commerce and was urged unsuccessfully to consider a run for politics.11
In 1988 Justice Côté moved to Montréal and became a civil and
commercial litigator at Stikeman Elliot LLP. She rose through the ranks
to become head of the litigation group. In 2010, she joined the Montréal
office of Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, assuming the position of head of
litigation there as well.12 A “widely respected”13 lawyer, “[s]he [was]
known as an extremely aggressive advocate.”14 Justice Côté was counsel
6
CBC News, “Suzanne Côté, Quebec lawyer, named by Harper to Supreme Court” (November
27, 2014), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/suzanne-c%C3%B4t%C3%A9-quebeclawyer-named-by-harper-to-supreme-court-1.2851974> [hereinafter “CBC, ‘Côté named by Harper’”];
Sean Fine, “PM picks Quebec lawyer Suzanne Côté for Supreme Court seat” (November 27, 2014), online:
Globe and Mail <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/new-judge-named-to-supremecourt/article21808810> [hereinafter “Fine, ‘PM picks Côté’”].
7
Fine, “PM picks Côté”, id. See also Pierre-Arnaud Barry-Camu, Amélie B. Lavigne &
Marie-Pier Albert, “Entretien avec Suzanne Côté” (2015) 45:3 Ottawa L. Rev. 527, at 542
[hereinafter “Barry-Camu et al., ‘Entretien’”].
8
In 2013, Prime Minister Harper nominated Federal Court of Appeal judge Marc Nadon to
one of the Québec seats on the Supreme Court of Canada. His eligibility for the appointment was
subsequently challenged, and in Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21,
2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.), a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Nadon was not, in fact,
eligible for the appointment. His appointment was annulled and in his place, Justice Clément Gascon
was appointed. See also Fine, “PM picks Côté”, supra, note 6; CBC, “Côté named by Harper”,
supra, note 6.
9
Fine, “PM picks Côté”, id.; CBC, “Côté named by Harper”, id.
10
Barry-Camu et al., “Entretien”, supra, note 7, at 532.
11
Id., at 534; Supreme Court of Canada, “The Honourable Suzanne Côté” (March 4, 2015),
online: Supreme Court of Canada <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id=suzannecote> [hereinafter “SCC Côté”].
12
“Suzanne Côté leaving Stikeman to head up litigation at Osler”, online: Montreal Gazette
<http://montrealgazette.com/business/suzanne-ct-leaving-stikeman-to-head-up-litigation-at-osler>.
13
Chris Hall, “Suzanne Côté, Harper’s Supreme Court pick, soothes a self-inflicted wound”
(November 27, 2014), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/suzanne-c%C3%B4t%
C3%A9-harper-s-supreme-court-pick-soothes-a-self-inflicted-wound-1.2852619> [hereinafter “Hall”].
14
Fine, “PM picks Côté”, supra, note 6.
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in several high-profile cases and commissions of inquiry, including the
Bastarache Inquiry and the Inquiry regarding Justice Lori Douglas.15
Speaking with reporters following her appointment, Osler colleague
Shahir Guindi referred to her as “amongst the hardest working lawyers,
bar none, that I’ve ever met in my life”.16
In a 2016 interview, Justice Côté spoke of the “mixed emotions” she
felt at leaving her career in private practice behind, referring to the loss
of her first career as a “death”.17 In a second interview, she explained that
the transition from private practice to the bench had required her to
adjust to the fact that she is no longer the principal decision-maker
(together with her client) on important legal matters.
SC: Coming from the private sector, when I worked in a law firm,
I always worked with a team of young lawyers. Even if we worked as a
team, my client and I always made the final decision. But at the
Supreme Court, there are nine of us. Being a court of nine judges, and
being the final court in Canada, we cannot all have a different opinion
and thus arrive at nine different opinions, the citizens have the right to
expect that we know what the state of the law is …
Interviewer: Do you negotiate amongst yourselves?
SC: Well … not necessarily negotiate, because one can never negotiate
one’s opinion. We do not always automatically have the answer. There
is a process of reflection, of discussion that takes place to arrive at the
best possible decision. There is that aspect to which I have had to
become accustomed.18

Justice Côté has explained that it is sometimes “easy” for the
Supreme Court to be unanimous.19 On other occasions, however, the
Court is unable to achieve unanimity and one or more justices will

15
Barry-Camu et al., “Entretien”, supra, note 7; Drew Hasselback, “New Supreme Court
of Canada appointee Suzanne Côté has national profile, known for taking on big cases”
(November 27, 2014), online: National Post <http://business.financialpost.com/legal-post/newsupreme-court-of-canada-appointee-suzanne-cote-has-national-profile-known-for-taking-on-big-cases>
[hereinafter “Hasselback”].
16
Hasselback, id.
17
Beyond Politics, “Interview with Justice Suzanne Côté” (2014), online: Canadian Public
Affairs Channel <http://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/documentaries/episodes/49689974> [hereinafter
“Beyond Politics, ‘Interview with Suzanne Côté’”].
18
Mitsou Gélinas, “Interview avec Suzanne Côté”, online: Mitsou.com <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=IP1jMyUFiN4> [translation].
19
Beyond Politics, “Interview with Suzanne Côté”, supra, note 17.
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dissent. She has pointed out that some dissents are later adopted by a
majority of the Court.20

III. METHODOLOGY
To assess the accuracy of the characterization of Justice Côté as a
frequent dissenter, I conducted quantitative and qualitative analyses of
her concurrences and dissents. At the time of writing, she had been
involved in deciding 150 cases. I first examined the combined rate of
concurrences and dissents of each Supreme Court justice since she joined
the Court. I included concurrences and dissents the judges authored as
well as ones they signed onto. I then disaggregated the data into
concurrences and dissents. Partial dissents were coded as dissents. One
case was excluded from consideration because the complex manner in
which the Court divided made rational coding impossible.21 Because the
judges did not all sit on the same cases during this period and
participated in different numbers of cases, the data provided below is
meant to give a general sense of the concurring and dissenting practices
of each of the judges during the relevant time frame.
Justice Côté has also adopted the unconventional practice of dissenting
on leave applications. I therefore examined the frequency with which
justices have dissented on leave applications since Justice Côté joined the
Court.22 I then searched the database of leave applications on the Lexum
website, which covers 2006 onwards, to determine how often judges have
dissented on leave applications since that time.23 I considered leave
applications separately from decisions on the merits of an appeal.
To further shed light on Justice Côté’s dissenting practices, I performed
a qualitative analysis of her concurrences and dissents. This involved
reviewing each of the cases in which she concurred and dissented. I
focused in particular on the nature of the disagreement with the majority.

20

Id.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Green, [2015] S.C.J. No. 60, 2015 SCC 60
(S.C.C.). I also excluded R. v. Magoon, [2017] S.C.J. No. 101, 2018 SCC 14 (S.C.C.) and R. v.
Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.), because at the time of writing these decisions
had been dismissed with reasons to follow. Lajeunesse c. 9069-4654 Québec inc., [2017] S.C.J. No.
24, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 473 (S.C.C.) was excluded because the appeal was found to be moot. The study
therefore examined 146 cases in which Justice Côté participated.
22
I am grateful to those, including Bruce Ryder and Ranjan Agarwal, who pointed out to
me the significance of Justice Côté’s dissents on leave applications.
23
Lexum, online: <https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/en/nav.do>.
21
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IV. FINDINGS
1. Quantitative Analysis
(a) Concurrences and Dissents on Appeals
Figure 1: Dissenting Practices of Current Court during Justice
Côté’s Tenure (March 23, 2015 to March 25, 2018)24
Judge

Majority
(%)

Côté

63.7 (93/146) 32.2
(47/146)

4.1 (6/146)

36.3 (53/146) 21.9
(32/146)

Abella

82.5
(127/154)

13.6
(21/154)

3.9 (6/154)

17.5 (27/154) 13.6
(21/154)

Brown

84.7 (94/111) 13.5
(15/111)

1.8 (2/111)

15.3 (17/111) 9 (10/111)

Cromwell

92.8 (77/83)

2.4 (2/83)

4.8 (4/83)

7.2 (6/83)

7.2 (6/83)

Gascon

92.5
(149/161)

5.6 (9/161) 1.9 (3/161)

7.5 (12/161)

4.4 (7/161)

Karakatsanis

91.4
(148/162)

5.5 (9/162) 3.1 (5/162)

8.6 (14/162)

4.9 (8/162)

McLachlin

86.8
(125/144)

8.3
(12/144)

4.9 (7/144)

13.2 (19/144) 6.3 (9/144)

Moldaver

87.9
(138/157)

9.6
(15/157)

2.5 (4/157)

12.1 (19/157) 7 (11/157)

Rothstein

97.3 (36/37)

2.7 (1/37)

0 (0/37)

2.7 (1/37)

Rowe

79.6 (43/54)

13 (7/54)

7.4 (4/54)

20.4 (11/54)

14.8 (8/54)

Wagner

90.2
(147/163)

6.7
(11/163)

3.1 (5/163)

9.8 (16/163)

5.5 (9/163)

Average

86.3

10.3

3.4

13.7

8.6

24

Dissents
(%)

Concurrences Combined
(%)
Concurrences
and
Dissents (%)

Wrote in
Concurrence
or
Dissent
(%)

0 (0/37)

The first decision in which Justice Côté participated was released on March 23, 2015: see
R. v. Sanghera, [2015] S.C.J. No. 13, 2015 SCC 13 (S.C.C.).
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The data set out above reveals that since being appointed, Justice Côté
has, in fact, disagreed with the majority much more often than her
colleagues. Figure 1 sets out the aggregate rate of concurrences and
dissents per justice since Justice Côté joined the Court. Côté was in the
majority in 63.7 per cent of cases. Her combined rate of concurrences
and dissents is 36.3 per cent, meaning that she concurred or dissented in
just over one-third of cases. There is no strong pattern of Justice Côté
concurring or dissenting with any one justice or group of justices.25 She
wrote for the concurrence or the dissent in 21.9 per cent of all cases
during this period, and in 60.4 per cent of cases in which she was
concurring or dissenting. In more than one-third of the cases in which
she concurred or dissented, she was writing for herself alone.
The average aggregate rate of concurrences and dissents during this
period was 13.7 per cent. The average rate at which a justice authored a
concurrence or dissent was 8.6 per cent. Justice Rowe was the next most
frequent dissenter after Justice Côté. He concurred or dissented in
20.4 per cent of cases. He is closely followed by Justice Abella, who
concurred or dissented in 17.5 per cent of cases.
Not all of the Justices included in Figure 1 sat for the entire period
under consideration. Justices Cromwell and Rothstein retired and
Justices Brown and Rowe were appointed during the period. Still,
Justices Cromwell and Brown participated in a substantial number of
cases during the period (83 in the case of Justice Cromwell, and 111 in
the case of Justice Brown). Justices Rothstein and Rowe sat on fewer
cases (37 in the case of Justice Rothstein and 54 in the case of Justice
Rowe). Justice Martin was excluded from consideration because of the
recency of her appointment (December 2017).
The overall rate of concurrences and dissents on the current Court is
low. Data collected by Belleau & Johnson covering the years 1982 to
2007 demonstrates a much livelier culture of disagreement than is
currently the case. I reproduce Belleau & Johnson’s data in Figure 2.

25
On voting blocs, see Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: The Evolution of the Supreme
Court of Canada (Toronto: Lorimer, 2000) [hereinafter “McCormick”]; Girard, supra, note 5, at
453.
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Figure 2: Belleau & Johnson’s Data on Rate of Dissents between
1982 and 2007
Judge

Dissent (%)

Concurrence (%)

Combined (%)

Abella

21.5

10.8

32.3

Arbour

14.8

10.2

25

Bastarache

25.1

13.6

38.7

Beetz

11.1

29.1

40.2

Binnie

16.3

7.2

23.5

Charron

14.3

7.9

22.2

Chouinard

12.8

20.9

33.7

Cory

9.8

19.4

29.2

Deschamps

23.9

10.1

34

Dickson

12.2

27.9

40.1

Estey

17.8

17.8

35.6

Fish

25.6

9.8

35

Gonthier

12.5

21.3

33.8

Iacobucci

10.2

14.3

24.5

L’Heureux-Dubé

28.1

31.5

59.6

La Forest

12

30.4

42.4

Lamer

13.4

29.1

42.5

LeBel

24.7

15.1

39.8

Le Dain

5.7

24.3

30

Major

19.5

14.3

33.8

McIntyre

16.4

23.5

39.9

McLachlin

19.6

23.6

43.2

Sopinka

17.3

25.7

43

Rothstein

15.8

10.5

26.3

Stevenson

14.3

28.8

43.1

Wilson

23.2

32.4

55.6

Average (all judges 16.8
in period)

19.6

36.4

The average aggregate rate of concurrences and dissents (i.e., the rate
of disagreement) during this period was 36.4 per cent. This is very
similar to Justice Côté’s aggregate rate. Several judges concurred and
dissented at a rate far greater than the average, including Justice
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L’Heureux-Dubé, who disagreed with the majority in 59.6 per cent of
cases, and Justice Wilson, who disagreed in 55.6 per cent of cases. The
rate at which Chief Justice McLachlin disagreed with the majority during
this period is much higher than in the period examined by the present
study. Between 1982 and 2007, then-Justice and eventually Chief Justice
McLachlin concurred or dissented in 43.2 per cent of cases. During the
study period (March 23, 2015 to March 25, 2018), her combined rate of
concurrences and dissents was 13.2 per cent.
When the data is disaggregated, it becomes clear that Justice Côté’s
rate of dissents is high, even by historical standards. Justice Côté
dissented in 32.2 per cent of cases and concurred in 4.1 per cent. The
average rate of dissents between 1982 and 2007 was 16.8 per cent, and
the average concurrence rate was 19.6 per cent. No judge during this
period matched Côté’s rate of dissents. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, the
most frequent dissenter during this time frame, dissented in 28.1 per
cent of cases and concurred in 31.5 per cent of cases. The second most
likely judge to disagree with the majority, Justice Wilson, dissented in
23.2 per cent of cases and concurred in 32.4 per cent of cases. Justice
and later Chief Justice McLachlin dissented in 19.6 per cent of cases
and concurred in 23.6 per cent. Most of the justices from this period
concurred at higher rates than they dissented.26
(b) Dissents on Leave Applications
Turning to dissents on leave applications, Justice Côté has dissented
on 10 leave applications to date — a small proportion of the 958 leave
decisions in which she participated, but significant nonetheless. Justice
Côté dissented alone on all but one of these applications, where she was
joined by Justice Moldaver.27 The 10 dissents were from dismissals of
applications for leave to appeal, meaning that she would have granted
leave. Since 2006, there have only been 11 dissents on leave
applications: in addition to the 10 just mentioned, Justice Ian Binnie
dissented from a decision to deny leave in 2006. Seven of the 10 dissents
were on cases with a private law dimension. Four involved class action

26
27

Belleau & Johnson, supra, note 4.
R. v. Rogers, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 438 (S.C.C.).
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cases, an area of expertise for Justice Côté.28 Three originated from
Québec and dealt with civil law matters (there was at least one other
Québec justice on the leave panel for each of these applications). Three
involved Aboriginal law issues; one was a criminal case.
On the first two occasions Justice Côté dissented from a decision to
deny leave to appeal, the panel deciding the application was a standard
panel of three justices. For the following eight applications, however, the
entire Court signed off on the leave decision. Decisions on leave
applications are always issued by “The Court”, even if the decision is
made by a panel of three judges.29 Once the three-person panel makes a
decision on a leave application, the decision is circulated to the entire
Court. If one of the justices objects to the decision of the panel, she or he
may ask that the application be considered by the entire Court. It appears
that the full Court will now also consider an application for leave to
appeal if one of the justices on the three-person panel intends to dissent.
This seems to be an innovation in response to Justice Côté’s decision to
dissent on some leave applications.
Seven of the 10 times she chose to dissent on a leave application,
Justice Côté was a member of the original leave panel. On three occasions
she was not on the original panel, suggesting that she or some other justice
(most likely she) picked the appeal off the list once the leave decisions
were circulated among the justices and requested that the entire Court
consider the application. She then dissented from the decision of the Court
as a whole. All three of these cases were class actions. On the one occasion
that she and Justice Moldaver dissented together on the leave application,
they were both members of the original panel, suggesting that a majority of
the initial panel was in favour of granting leave in the case, but that
decision was overturned by the Court as a whole.
2. Qualitative Analysis
Further insights emerge from a qualitative examination of Justice
Côté’s concurrences and dissents. A review of her decisions shows that
she is willing to concur or dissent both where the legal questions are
of considerable significance as well as on more technical grounds.
28
I am grateful to Ranjan Agarwal for pointing this out. See also Sean Fine, “New Supreme
Court judge challenged on conduct as a lawyer in two cases” Globe and Mail (December 5, 2014),
online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/new-supreme-court-judge-challenged-onconduct-as-a-lawyer-in-two-cases/article21964776>.
29
I am grateful to Barbara Kinkaid for pointing this out to me.
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In Caron v. Alberta, for example, she dissented in an important language
rights case.30 But she also dissented on more than one occasion to correct
palpable and overriding factual errors she concluded the trial judge had
committed.31 She has also dissented on cursory, one or two paragraph
decisions issued from the bench. The Supreme Court will typically
decide a case from the bench where the issues are clear-cut or where an
obvious error was committed in the court(s) below. It is uncommon to
see dissents in these kinds of cases. In Millington,32 M.J.B.33 and
Robinson,34 however, Justice Côté dissented from opinions delivered
from the bench.
Several of Justice Côté’s concurrences and dissents are notable for
their rigorous approach to appellate review. Her decisions demonstrate a
willingness to overturn the decisions of trial courts or other adjudicators
at first instance, even when there is a presumption of deferential review.35
In several dissents, Justice Côté engaged in a granular review of the
evidence and/or the reasons of the trial court and/or the intermediate
court of appeal.36 In Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP v.
Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP,37 she justified the use of such an
approach in that case by explaining that “[i]n disputes involving an
international or interprovincial aspect, jurisdiction is a matter of crucial
importance. It must be approached with rigour”.38 In Assn. of Justice
Counsel v. Canada (Attorney General), Justice Côté engaged in a close
reading of the adjudicator’s reasons and found that his “conclusions
[were] not defensible in respect of either the facts or the law.”39 In
Mennillo, she held that “the trial judge made palpable and overriding

30

[2015] S.C.J. No. 56, 2015 SCC 56 (S.C.C.).
See, e.g., Benhaim v. St-Germain, [2016] S.C.J. No. 48, 2016 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Benhaim”]; R. v. Millington, [2017] S.C.J. No. 53, 2017 SCC 53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Millington”];
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errors and disregarded key evidence”.40 Her dissents are typically
thorough and comprehensive treatments of the issues rather than terse
expressions of disagreement. In Mennillo, for example, she authored a
173-paragraph dissent.41 The majority judgment was 81 paragraphs long,
and there was a seven-paragraph concurrence by Chief Justice
McLachlin, with whom Justice Moldaver concurred. Godbout v. Pagé;42
Sciascia;43 Barreau du Québec v. Québec (Attorney General);44
Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Lemare Lake Logging Ltd.45 and
Benhaim v. St-Germain are other examples of this approach.
A large subset of the cases characterized by rigorous review deal with
the standard of review in administrative law.46 In these cases, Justice
Côté either concluded that the standard of review was reasonableness and
that it had not been satisfied, or she found that the appropriate standard
of review was correctness.
Finally, Justice Côté’s dissents provide some evidence that her expertise
as a corporate-commercial lawyer inform her decision-making in cases
that deal with the lawyer’s role and the realities of commercial
transactions. This expertise is evident in cases such as Quebec (Director of
Criminal and Penal Prosecutions) v. Jodoin,47 an appeal concerning the
awarding of costs against a lawyer personally, and Barreau du Québec v.
Québec, a case regarding the scope of a non-lawyer’s right to make legal
submissions in writing to an administrative tribunal. In Edmonton (City) v.
Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., Justice Côté
emphasized that her reading of the governing legislation “reflects the fact
40

Supra, note 31, at para. 103.
On the significance of the length of written reasons, see generally Peter McCormick,
“Standing Apart: Separate Concurrence and the Modern Supreme Court of Canada, 1984-2006”
(2008) 53 McGill L.J. 137.
42
[2017] S.C.J. No. 18, 2017 SCC 18 (S.C.C.).
43
R. v. Sciascia, [2017] S.C.J. No. 57, 2017 SCC 57 (S.C.C.).
44
[2017] S.C.J. No. 56, 2017 SCC 56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Barreau du Québec v.
Québec”].
45
[2015] S.C.J. No. 53, 2015 SCC 53 (S.C.C.).
46
Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., [2016] S.C.J. No. 29, 2016 SCC 29 (S.C.C.);
Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., [2016] S.C.J. No. 47, 2016 SCC
47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd.”]; Canada (Attorney
General) v. Igloo Vikski Inc., [2016] S.C.J. No. 38, 2016 SCC 38 (S.C.C.); Commission scolaire de
Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval, [2016] S.C.J. No. 8, 2016 SCC 8 (S.C.C.);
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Guérin, [2017] S.C.J. No. 42, 2017 SCC 42 (S.C.C.); Green v. Law
Society of Manitoba, [2017] S.C.J. No. 20, 2017 SCC 20 (S.C.C.); British Columbia (Workers’
Compensation Appeal Tribunal) v. Fraser Health Authority, [2016] S.C.J. No. 25, 2016 SCC 25
(S.C.C.); Barreau du Québec v. Québec (Attorney General), supra, note 44; Teal Cedar Products Ltd.
v. British Columbia, [2017] S.C.J. No. 32, 2017 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). See also Danay, supra, note 36.
47
[2017] S.C.J. No. 26, 2017 SCC 26 (S.C.C.).
41

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

DISSENTER ON THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 59

that the complaints process is pleading-driven,”48 demonstrating an
awareness of the significance of the procedural aspects of lawyering. And
in Lapointe Rosenstein, a class action lawsuit brought against law firm
Cassels Brock for negligent legal advice, Justice Côté drew on her
experience as a lawyer in reasoning about the factors that lawyers consider
relevant when they enter into contracts. In terms of understanding
commercial realities, Ferme Vi‑Ber inc. v. Financière agricole du Québec;49
Mennillo; Canada (Attorney General) v. Fairmont Hotels Inc.50 and Jean
Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)51 are all examples
of dissents in which Justice Côté drew on her understanding of commercial
transactions in reaching a decision in the case.

V. DISCUSSION
1. Making Sense of the Data
Three initial conclusions can be drawn from the data on Justice Côté’s
dissenting practices. The first is that her rate of dissents is high, both
by current and by historical standards. It exceeds that of Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé, the most frequent dissenter between 1982 and 2007.
The second is that her rate of dissents is high relative to the rate at which
she concurs. All of the most frequent dissenters in the period covered by
Belleau & Johnson’s work concurred more often than they dissented. The
opposite is true for Justice Côté, by a considerable margin. Third, Justice
Côté’s aggregate rate of dissents and concurrences is high by current
standards but insignificant by historical standards. In fact, it is average
for the period from 1982 to 2007.
These conclusions stand in some tension with each other. If
disagreement is understood as being reflected in both concurrences and
dissents, then the rate at which she disagrees is average for the period
between 1982 and 2007. If we confine ourselves to dissents, however,
we reach the opposite conclusion: her rate of dissents is very high, higher
than that of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, the most frequent dissenter between
1982 and 2007.
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One way to resolve the tension might be to return to the issue of how
different concurrences and dissents really are. After all, if the differences
are marginal, then it makes little sense to separate them out and to treat
concurrences as though they do not reflect meaningful disagreement. The
problem, of course, is that not all concurrences are created equal. In its
decisions, the Court distinguishes between “concurring reasons”,52
“reasons concurring in the result”,53 and “reasons concurring in part”.54
Some concurrences reflect significant agreement with the reasons of the
majority. Others are concurrences in name only; they are best read as
expressing profound disagreement with the majority. In between these
two extremes lies a number of further permutations. This means that
however one chooses to code concurrences, some nuance will be lost.
Another option for addressing the tension might be to think about why
we examine rates of concurrence and dissent in the first place. What
conclusions do we draw about a justice when we characterize her as a
frequent dissenter? One reason for the particular interest in Justice Côté’s
rate of concurrences and dissents is that it is at odds with the current
practices of the Court. Since joining the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice
Côté has demonstrated a willingness to disagree in spite of efforts by
former Chief Justice McLachlin to achieve consensus. Justice Côté has also
shown a willingness to speak in her own voice, whether in the majority, in a
concurrence, or in dissent. Her dissents on leave applications further
contribute to this pattern of standing apart. Justice Côté has dissented on 10
such applications since joining the Court. To put this number in context, it
is important to recall that since 2006, there have only been 11 dissents on
leave applications. She was the sole dissenter in all but one of these 11
cases, where Justice Moldaver also dissented. Again, this suggests a
willingness to break from convention and a desire to stand apart. No other
justice has followed her lead with the exception of the one instance in
which Justice Moldaver also dissented.
Here, the rate of dissents is of interest because it seems to upset or at
least threaten a balance that had been achieved on the current Court.55 In
52
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assessing what Justice Côté’s numbers tell us about this issue, it is
helpful to consider all the available data, including her aggregate rate of
concurrences and dissents, her rate of dissents on its own, and her
dissents on leave applications. All of these numbers are exceptional in
terms of the current Court.
Somewhat different considerations come into play when we examine
Justice Côté’s concurrences and dissents in historical perspective. Looking
at a judge’s rate of concurrences and dissents in historical context may
prompt a comparison of the concurring and dissenting practices of
particular “Courts” at particular points in time — “the Lamer Court”
versus the “McLachlin Court”, for example, or the “early-Charter Court”
versus the “Court in 2018”.56 A historical analysis can also promote a close
examination of the judge herself, apart from the particular dynamics of
“her” Court — what kind of judge she is, what motivates her, and what she
stands for.57 It seems logical that in assessing the historical significance of
a judge’s concurring and dissenting practices, one would want to consider
the aggregate rate of concurrences and dissents as well as the rate of
dissents on its own. This gives us a sense of how often a judge chooses to
write or sign on to reasons that express some disagreement. It represents a
considered decision not to sign on to the majority decision in spite of the
acknowledged value of achieving consensus where possible.
2. Impact on the Current Court
Even if one accepts the value of dissents as a general matter, one
might reasonably ask whether Justice Côté’s persistent practice of
dissenting could undermine important goals or aspects of the Court’s
functioning. This includes eroding consensus where it might otherwise
have been achieved with some additional work, or weakening the
collegiality of the Court through resistance to the conventions of the
institution.58 Of course, one person’s agitator is another person’s leader.
At the same time, collegiality and common purpose are crucial features
Backhouse, supra, note 5; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin
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of multi-member courts. When a single member of the Court adopts a set
of practices that are at odds with the practices of the rest of the Court,
there is a risk of eroding collegiality.
This concern arises in part as a result of Justice Côté’s approach to
judging. The intensity of the review in which she engages in some cases
appears to be in tension with the nature of appellate review by an apex
court and the flexibility inherent in the requirement that trial judges give
sufficient reasons.59 It is not clear that the level of rigour and granularity
Justice Côté brings to her analysis is always justified, either from the
standpoint of the standard of appellate review of a final court of appeal
or from the standpoint of whether a narrow disagreement justifies writing
a dissent in a particular case.
In a 2014 interview with Catherine Clark, Justice Côté spoke about
the traditions of the Supreme Court and their significance.
I think that we have some traditions, we need to keep these traditions,
for instance when we wear our red robes for official events, and things
like that, and the decorum also is important, because given the type of
institution that the Court is, the Court deserves respect, and I think you
can reach that when you have some sort of decorum and traditions. But
I think that the Court is a younger court now, and is not as traditional as
it was before. Again I think it follows the evolution of the society. I’m
not saying that the members of the Court are people going out every
night to dance, but it is not as traditional as it was I think before.60

It is fair to read this statement as saying that Justice Côté believes that
some of the Court’s traditions are valuable and should be preserved,
while others are unnecessary or even harmful to the Court’s progress as
an institution. The difficult part, of course, is knowing how to
characterize the various aspects of the Court’s heritage and practices.
There is also the matter of how changes to heritage and/or practice
should occur — whether they should be the product of collective
decision-making or whether it is sufficient for changes to occur
organically over time.
One might deduce from Justice Côté’s dissents that she does not view
the practice of deciding leave applications unanimously as being an
important tradition of the Court. That it is a tradition of the Court is without
doubt. Until Justice Côté was appointed, there was a near-universal
59
Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at para. 72 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Shepherd, [2009] S.C.J. No. 35, 2009 SCC 35 (S.C.C.).
60
“Inside the Supreme Court”, supra, note 58.

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

DISSENTER ON THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 63

practice of reaching decisions on whether to grant leave by consensus (or
at least without communicating internal disagreements about whether
leave should be granted). She has also demonstrated what might fairly be
described as a lower threshold for dissenting than her current colleagues.
She has done so on a Court that until recently was led by a Chief Justice
who placed a very high value on consensus. This suggests that Justice
Côté has a weaker commitment to consensus decision-making than other
members of the Court.
It is also worth considering whether Justice Côté’s willingness to
dissent, even on leave applications, will lower the barriers to dissent for
other Justices, and whether this is problematic. Given the persistent
possibility that Justice Côté will dissent, there may be less of an
incentive for the other members of the Court to strive for consensus. The
less that consensus is viewed as achievable, one might imagine, the more
likely it will be to see judges write for themselves.
3. Looking Back, Looking Forward
Belleau & Johnson explain that “[s]ome judicial reputations have
been solidified by the power of canonical dissents.”61 This statement
suggests that the quality of the concurrence or dissent matters. For
example, while Justice Arbour was not a frequent dissenter, many of her
dissents or concurrences have proven to be very influential, if not in the
courts then in the scholarship.62 Her dissents in Gosselin;63 MalmoLevine; Caine64 and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the
Law65 stand out in this regard.
The impact of a dissent can be measured in a few ways. One way is to
look at whether the dissent attracted the support of other judges on the
Court. Another is to see whether over time, a dissenting opinion becomes
a majority opinion. A third way of measuring the significance of a dissent
is to assess whether the opinion is understood to voice important values,
even if those values do not command majority support.66 Sometimes the
61
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impact of a decision is evident immediately; other times its significance
only becomes evident over time.
It is of some note that Justice Côté is writing on her own in concurrence
or dissent 37.7 per cent of the time. This means that more than one-third of
the time, her dissent did not attract the support of any other judge (though
other judges may have concurred or dissented separately). It is too early to
say whether some of her dissents may become majority opinions over
time. The qualitative analysis suggests that this is unlikely for at least some
of her dissents, since the nature of the disagreement is best characterized as
being fact-based. Indeed, Justice Côté’s dissents on technical matters are
unlikely to have significant impact.
It is interesting to consider whether Justice Côté will continue to
dissent at her current rate, or whether the frequency of her dissents might
increase or decrease over time. The data demonstrates, for example, that
former Chief Justice McLachlin’s rate of dissents dropped dramatically
over time. It seems likely that any newly appointed judge will take some
time to adapt to the dynamics of a multi-member court. This is
particularly so where the judge is appointed directly from practice.67 This
tends to suggest that her rate of dissents could diminish over time.
However, Belleau & Johnson point out that a judge’s rate of dissents
does not invariably move in a downward direction. “Some judges (like
Justice Wilson) generated more dissents the longer they were on the
Court while others (like Justice Sopinka) started as great dissenters, but
produced increasingly less dissent the longer they were on the Court.”68
The discussion above suggests that there is more to judicial decisionmaking than simply the merits of the appeal. While this may be
controversial, there is no question that judging is a human process. It is
legitimate, in other words, to ask what costs and benefits are associated
with a single judge habitually departing from the conventions of the Court.

VI. CONCLUSION
As the frequency of Justice Côté’s dissents have increased, so too has
the level of interest in her judicial philosophy and approach. The data
presented in this paper demonstrates that Justice Côté’s concurring and
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dissenting practices are indeed noteworthy. However, as I have pointed
out, these practices, like all judicial practices, will not necessarily remain
static. They are subject to a range of influences. There is value, therefore,
in continuing to follow the concurring and dissenting practices of Justice
Côté and the Court as a whole, particularly under a new Chief Justice. It
is possible, for example, that her rate of concurrences and dissents will
hold constant while that of other members of the Court increases,
tempering the perception that she is a frequent dissenter. There are some
suggestions that this might occur. It will also be interesting to see what
the impact of Justice Côté’s concurrences and dissents will be over time,
and whether she continues to approach appellate review with the same
intensity she does currently.

